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Common Law Liability for Leaking
Underground Storage Tanks
MICHAEL J. MAHER*

Nationwide, it is estimated that there are over two million underground storage tanks ("USTs") in 750,000 different locations with
over 100,000 confirmed leaks.' The Illinois State Fire Marshal has
estimated that in Illinois, there are an estimated 80,000 USTs, of
which 75 percent have leaked, are leaking or will leak. 2 USTs containing substances ranging from innocuous to extremely toxic are
located throughout the state in factories, tank farms, recycling centers,
corner service stations, office buildings, municipal buildings, residences, apartment buildings and farms. One drop of gasoline can
contaminate a gallon of water. Approximately 5.5 million Illinois
residents rely on groundwater for their drinking water.3 Improper
installation, operation or maintenance of a UST can pose a significant
environmental risk to persons residing both near and far from the
UST.
This article analyzes Illinois common law causes of action against
owners and operators of USTs for releases or spills resulting in offsite migration. Where available, Illinois cases involving USTs will be
cited. However, due to the relative dearth of such cases, the application of common law theories to USTs will be analyzed by analogy.
Finally, a small compendium of common law cases from other
jurisdictions will be provided following each section. This compendium is not intended to be exhaustive.
* Mr. Maher is an attorney with McKenna, Storer, Rowe, White and Farrug

in Chicago, Illinois. After receiving his J.D. from the Northern Illinois University
College of Law, Mr. Maher was an Assistant Attorney General of Illinois in the
Environmental Control Division from 1986-87. He was Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Illinois Pollution Control Board from 1987-89. Mr. Maher teaches
environmental law as an adjunct faculty member at Kent/I.T.T. College of Law.
1. David W. Ziegele & Jay A. Evans, Regulating UndergroundStorage Tank
Systems, 27 TRIAL 34 (Sept. 1991).
2. OFFICE OF STATE FIRE MARSHAL NEWSLETTER (Ill. State Fire Marshal),
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GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Under Illinois common law, monetary damages and injunctive
relief are available to parties suffering personal injury or property
damage. Money damages seek to place the injured party in, as nearly
as possible, the same position the party would have enjoyed but for
the injury or damage.4 In 1989, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that
a complaint containing allegations of friable asbestos in insulation
5
materials within schools pled an action for property damage. Applying this holding in 1990, a Federal District Court ruled that a plaintiff
sufficiently pled an action for property damage by alleging that soils
on-site were contaminated with hazardous substances. 6 It is suggested
that cases involving leakage or spills of substances into nearby soils
or property will probably follow the above cases where the complaints
alleging contamination in adjoining soils state an action for property
damage.
The compensation appropriate for property damage depends on
whether the injury is permanent or temporary. 7 The proper compensation for permanent injury is the loss in fair market value. The8
proper compensation for temporary injury is the cost of restoration.
The rule is not applied in a rigid manner and, in appropriate cases,
Illinois courts have assessed restoration costs, 9 damages for loss of
value, 10 damages for inconvenience and discomfort, 1 punitive damages,' 2 and have granted injunctive relief. 3
Although the State of Illinois has promulgated extensive regulaProtection Act 5
tions governing USTs, 1 4 the Illinois Environmental
6
does not preempt common law actions.'

1992).

4.
5.
6.
7.

See, e.g., Roark v. Musgrave, 355 N.E.2d 91, 94 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976).
Board of Educ. v. AC&S, Inc., 546 N.E.2d 580, 590 (Ill. 1989).
Quadion' Corp. v. Mache, 738 F. Supp. 270, 275 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
See Hudlin v. City of East St. Louis, 591 N.E.2d 541, 553 (Ill. App. Ct.

8. Id. (citing Arras v. Columbia Quarry Co., 367 N.E.2d 580, 583-84 (111.
App. Ct. 1977)).
9. See Rodrian v. Seiber, 551 N.E.2d 772, 774-75 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
10. Tamalunis v. City of Georgetown, 542 N.E.2d 402, 409 (Ill. App. Ct.
1989), appeal denied, 548 N.E.2d 1079 (11. 1989).
11. See Van Brocklin v. Gudema, 199 N.E.2d 457, 462 (Il. App. Ct. 1964).
12. See Freese v. Buoy, 576 N.E.2d 1176, 1183 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (applying
principles from Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353 (Il. 1978)).
13. See Ariola v. Nigro, 156 N.E.2d 536, 543 (Ill. 1959).
14. See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 35, §§ 731.110-901 (1992).
15. 415 ILCS 5/1-5/56.5 (1992).
16. 415 ILCS 5/2(v) (1992); 415 ILCS 5/22.18b (1992); Monmouth v. Illinois
Pollution Control Bd., 313 N.E.2d 161, 163 (Ill. 1974).
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II.

TRESPASS

A trespass is an invasion of the right of exclusive possession or
physical condition of land. 7 The distinction between an intentional
trespass and negligence is important in determining not only the relief
available, but also in determining the necessity of proving actual
damages. 8 Generally, every intentional trespass justifies the award of
nominal damages without proof of actual damages.
In Illinois, three types of conduct give rise to trespass: (1) conduct
purposefully intended to cause an intrusion on the premises; (2)
negligent conduct resulting in an intrusion on the premises; and (3)
ultrahazardous conduct resulting in an intrusion, such that liability is
absolute.' 9 Actions based on negligent conduct or ultrahazardous
activities will be addressed separately in a later section of this article.
In adopting Sections 158 and 165 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that a person is liable for
trespass not only for his oroher entry onto the land of another, but
also if he or she causes a thing or third person to enter onto such
land. 20 Liability for intentional trespass attaches when the defendant
acts with knowledge that his or her conduct will, to a "substantial
certainty," result in the entry of a foreign matter onto the premises
of another. 2' Although research has disclosed no reported Illinois
cases finding liability in trespass for leaking USTs, Illinois courts have
previously found liability for one farmer's usurping another's acre23
age, 22 a landowner's removal of trees from a neighbor's property,
shooting bullets onto neighboring property, 24 a municipality's improper management of a municipal sewer resulting in raw sewage
pouring onto another's land, 25 and for encroachment by construction
26
on another's land.
17. Colwell Sys., Inc. v. Henson, 452 N.E.2d 889, 892 (I11.App. Ct. 1983).
18. Dial v. City of O'Fallon, 411 N.E.2d 217, 220 (Ill. 1980).
19. Id.

20. Id. Other jurisdictions have also addressed trespass issues in UST cases.
Rushing v. Hooper-McDonald, Inc., 300 So.2d 94 (Ala. 1974); Pan American
Petroleum Co. v. Byars, 153 So. 616 (Ala. 1934); Adkins v. Thomas Solvents Co.,
487 N.W.2d 715 (Mich. 1992). See also Shockley v. Hoechst-Celanese Corp., 793 F.
Supp. 670 (D. S.C. 1992) (applying South Carolina law).
21. Dial, 411 N.E.2d at 220.
22. Freese v. Buoy, 576 N.E.2d 1176 (I11.App. Ct. 1991).
23. Rodrian v. Seiber, 551 N.E.2d 772 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
24. Statler v. Catalano, 521 N.E.2d 565 (I11.App. Ct. 1988).
25. Dial v. City of O'Fallon, 411 N.E.2d 217 (Il. 1980).
26. Ariola v. Nigro, 156 N.E.2d 536 (II1.1959).
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It is suggested that factors directly impacting a defendant's
"substantial certainty" that a foreign matter will discharge from a
UST onto another's land should include the following: the distance
of the USTs from the property line; the extent to which the UST
owner or operator is charged with knowledge of the geology of the
site or the hydrology of the groundwaters; the composition of the
UST at issue, including manufacturer's instructions for installation
and maintenance and warnings about useful life or possible corrosion;
the frequency of product inventory accounting; the frequency of tank
tightness testing; any history of leaks, spills or overfills during tank
filling or product dispensing; any history of tank inspections; any
failure to take precautions against leaks; and any failure to reclaim
or recover product following known spills or releases. 27
In non-UST trespass cases, Illinois courts have issued injunctions
against further trespasses, issued mandatory injunctions [e.g. ordered
clean-up] 28 and have assessed restoration costs, 29 damages for the
value of property taken,30 nominal damages only' and punitive damages. 3 2 Moreover, the First Appellate District has allowed actions
claiming loss of business profits resulting from a trespass.33

III.

NUISANCE

A private nuisance is a civil wrong based on an interference in
the use or enjoyment of an individual's land whereas a public nuisance
34
is an act or omission causing inconvenience or damage to the public.
Actions for private nuisance can overlap with actions in trespass. In
appropriate cases, both actions may be maintained. 5 The difference
between a private nuisance and trespass is that a trespass is an invasion
upon the land, whereas a private nuisance is a non-trespassory inter6
ference in the use or enjoyment of the land.
27. William B. Johnson, Annotation, Tort Liability for Pollution from Underground Storage Tanks, 5 A.L.R.5th 1 (1992).
28. Ariola v. Nigro, 156 N.E.2d 536 (Il. 1959).
29. O'Brien v. City of O'Fallon, 400 N.E.2d 456 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
30. Rodrian v. Seiber, 551 N.E.2d 772 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
31. E.g., Freese v. Buoy, 576 N.E.2d 1176 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
32. Statler v. Catalano, 521 N.E.2d 565 (Il1. App. Ct. 1988).
33. Miller v. Simon, 241 N.E.2d 697, 700 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968), appeal denied
sub nom, Simon v. Miller, 612 N.E.2d 523 (Ill. 1993); Falejczyk v. Meo, 176 N.E.2d
10 (Ill. App. Ct. 1961).
34. See Village of Wilsonville v. S.C.A. Services, Inc., 426 N.E.2d 824, 834
(Ill. 1981) (citing WILLIAM J. PROSSER ET AL., TORTS §§ 86, 88 (4th ed. 1971)).
35. Colwell Sys., Inc. v. Henson, 452 N.E.2d 889, 892 (Il. App. Ct. 1983).
36. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821(d) (1979)).
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Conduct constituting a private nuisance necessarily involves a
"substantial interference" with the use or enjoyment of a plaintiff's
land as measured by the sensibilities of the ordinary reasonable person.
Consequently, the use to which a plaintiff puts the land cannot involve
abnormal sensibilities." In the context of USTs, the issue of a
plaintiff's sensitivity will depend upon the substance being leaked
(e.g. mineral water vs. soft drink syrup vs. petroleum vs. dioxin) and
the methodology or mechanism of the interference (e.g. emission of
noxious fumes vs. groundwater contamination of a shared aquifer).
In sum, courts will consider whether an ordinary person would suffer
substantial interference in the use or enjoyment of the property 3 and
balance this interference against the benefits to the community from
a defendant's activity and the suitability of the activity to the location
where it is conducted.3 9
In analyzing whether a nuisance exists, a court will determine
whether the source of the nuisance is permanent or temporary. A
permanent nuisance continues indefinitely where the source of the
interference is a lawful structure or where the defendant has a legal
right to engage in the complained of activity. In such a case the
nuisance can reasonably be expected to continue. Damages for a
permanent nuisance are, therefore, the reduction in fair market value
due to the continuing nuisance. A temporary nuisance is one which
is occasional, intermittent or recurrent and is remediable, removable
or abatable. 40 Nuisances caused by negligent construction of a structure or negligent operation of a legal enterprise are generally temporary. 4' Proper damages for a temporary nuisance are measured by the
personal inconvenience, annoyance and discomfort suffered, 42 including injury to rental value. 43 In Illinois, the discharge of sewage is an
abatable nuisance. 44 Damages for a temporary nuisance, therefore,
are appropriate. It is suggested that when Illinois courts find a

37. Belmar Drive-In Theatre Co. v. Illinois State Toll Highway Comm'n, 216

N.E.2d 788, 790-91 (Il1. 1966).

38. See id.; see also Schatz v. Abbott Lab., Inc., 281 N.E.2d 323 (Il. 1972).
39. Pasulka v. Koob, 524 N.E.2d 1227, 1238 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988), appeal
denied, 530 N.E.2d 250 (11. 1988).
40. Tamalunis v. City of Georgetown, 542 N.E.2d 402, 409-10 (Ill. App. Ct.
1989) (citing 58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisances §§ 117-18 (1971), appeal denied, 548 N.E.2d

1079 (Il. 1989)).

41. Id. at 410.

42. Schatz, 281 N.E.2d at 325.

43. N.K. Fairbanks Co. v. Nicolai, 47 N.E. 360, 361 (Ill. 1897).

44. See Dierks v. Comm'r of Highways, 31 N.E. 496, 501 (Ill. 1892).
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nuisance from leakage or discharge from USTs, the courts will treat
45
it as a temporary nuisance.
Cases involving interference with the use of a home or residence
will generally focus on the loss of enjoyment and the annoyance
caused by the nuisance. Cases involving businesses alleging temporary
nuisance will generally focus on the loss of use or loss of profits
caused by the nuisance." Allegations of loss of profits raise complex
47
issues of proof and must be pled carefully.
One Illinois court recently addressed a UST case alleging nuisance. 48 In Malone v. Ware Oil Co.,49 the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant's gasoline had seeped through ground soils into the plaintiff's basement. The court ruled that the plaintiff failed to prove that
the defendant intentionally or negligently caused the release which
resulted in the strong odor of gasoline being present in the plaintiff's
basement. In so doing, the court disregarded evidence that the tanks
leaked gasoline at the rate of .127 gallons per hour because this
amount complied with a municipal ordinance's limit. The court also
disregarded testimony that a cup of gasoline was spilled during tank
filling on an average of three times per week, because "[tihis amount
of spillage was obviously so small as to be insignificant." 50 However,
the amount of gasoline "lost" in one single year from these two
events was in excess of 550 gallons. Moreover, gasoline is so toxic
that one drop can contaminate a gallon of drinking water. This fact
was part of the reason why Illinois promulgated extensive UST
regulations designed to prevent product losses of this magnitude.5 In
all fairness, the court's decision was published within weeks of federal
UST regulations becoming effective 2 and before Illinois had promulgated its own UST regulations. 3 Nevertheless, the court's opinion
45.
App. Ct.
46.
47.
48.

See, however, O'Brien v. City of O'Fallon, 400 N.E.2d 456, 459-60 (Il.
1980).
Schatz, 281 N.E.2d at 325-26.
See 20 ILLINOIS DIOEST 2d Damages §§ 99, 103, 117 (West Supp. 1993).
Malone v. Ware Oil Co., 534 N.E.2d 1003 (Il1. App. Ct. 1989). Other

jurisdictions have addressed nuisance issues in UST cases. Citizens & Southern Trust
Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 385 S.E.2d 426 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989); Mel Foster Co.
Properties, Inc. v. American Oil Co., 427 N.W.2d 171 (Iowa 1988); Exxon Corp. v.
Yarema, 516 A.2d 990 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986); Cornell v. Exxon Corp., 558
N.Y.S.2d 647 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
49. 534 N.E.2d 1003 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).

50. Id. at 1007.
51.

ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

GUIDANCE MANUAL FOR

PETROLEUM-RELATED L.U.S.T. CLEAN-UP IN ILLINOIS (Spring 1990). See also ILL.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 35, §§ 731.110-731.901 (1992).

52. 40 C.F.R. § 280 (1992).
53. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 35, §§ 731.110-731.901 (1992).
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disregarded testimony of spills during tank filling, that periodic tank

tightness tests would probably have detected such leakage, and that
regular product inventory accounting could detect leakage that might,
otherwise, migrate onto neighboring properties. It is suggested that

this decision may not be the last word on this issue.
IV.

NEGLIGENCE

The general rule of property ownership is that an owner (or
operator) of real property retains the privilege to use his or her
4
property for any legitimate purpose, subject to due regard for others.1
In order to state a property-based action in negligence, a plaintiff
must allege the existence of a duty, a breach of that duty and damages
resulting therefrom." Questions of breach and causation are fact
issues, but whether a legal duty exists between a UST owner or
operator and a plaintiff is a question of law.16 The existence of a duty
regarding off-site plaintiffs depends upon whether the source of injury
is a natural condition. 7 In determining whether a duty exists, Illinois
has adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which at Section 364
provides as follows:
A possessor of land is subject to liability to others outside of
the land for physical harm caused by a structure or other
artificial condition on the land, which the possessor realizes
or should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of such
harm, if
(a) the possessor has created the condition, or
(b)
(c)

the condition was created ... with the possessor's
consent or acquiescence . . . , or
the condition was created . . . without the possessor's

consent or acquiescence, but reasonable care is not

taken . . . after the possessor knows or should have

known of it."

54. Dealers Serv. & Supply Co. v. St. Louis Nat'l Stockyards, 508 N.E.2d
1241, 1245 (I11.App. Ct. 1987).
55. Id. at 1243 (citing Curtis v. County of Cook, 456 N.E.2d 116, 118 (I11.
1983).
56. Other jurisdictions have addressed negligence issues in UST cases. Exxon
v. Yarema, 516 A.2d 990 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986); P. Ballantine & Sons v. Public
Serv. Corp., 70 A. 167 (1908); New York Telephone Co. v. Mobile Oil Co., 473
N.Y.S.2d 172 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984); Masten v. Texas Co., 140 S.E. 89 (N.C. 1927);
Lerro v. Thomas Wynne, Inc., 301 A.2d 705 (Pa. 1973); Cooper v. Whiting Oil Co.,
311 S.E.2d 757 (Va. 1984).
57. Curtis, 456 N.E.2d at 119.
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) ON TORTS § 364 (1976).
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An underground storage tank is clearly an artificial structure on the
land of which the owner has or should have knowledge. Moreover,
given extensive state and federal list regulations (governing such issues
as design, construction, installation, monitoring, product inventory
and leak detection) and the fact that USTs are designed to hold
extremely toxic substances, it is possible that Illinois courts might
rule, as a matter of law, that UST owners and operators have a duty
to use due care to prevent the off-site migration of toxic substances.
In a similar case, one Illinois court ruled that the owner/possessor of
realty owed a duty to his adjoining landowners where the property
was knowingly used to dispose of flammable wastes.5 9 It is suggested
that, at a minimum, UST owners and operators owe their neighbors
a duty to comply with all applicable state and federal UST regulations,
and failure to comply with these regulations may constitute a prima
facie case of negligence (i.e. violation of statute or administrative
regulation). 60 In Illinois, such pleadings are not conclusive proof of
negligence, but do constitute circumstantial evidence of negligence
which can be rebutted by evidence that the defendant acted reasonably
6
under the circumstances - despite the violation. '
Another method of establishing negligence is by pleading an
action pursuant to the legal doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. In affirming
a jury instruction in res ipsa loquitur against a gas company whose
gas lines had lain undisturbed for seven years prior to an unexplained
explosion, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled: "[T]he doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur . . . [allows] proof of negligence by circumstantial
evidence when the direct evidence [of] cause of injury is primarily
'62
within the knowledge and control of the defendant.
In Metz, the court noted that natural gas is a dangerous commodity, and the gas company owned and installed the gas main and
was solely responsible for its maintenance. 63 Seventeen years later, the
court set forth the essential requirements:
To avail itself of the doctrine [res ipsa loquitur], plaintiff...
[must plead] that he was injured (1) in an occurrence that
would not have occurred in the absence of negligence, (2) by

59. Dealers Serv. & Supply Co., 508 N.E.2d at 1244-45.

60.
61.
62.
63.

Davis v. Marathon Oil Co., 356 N.E.2d 93, 97 (I1l. 1976).
Id.
1965).
Metz v. Central Illinois Elec. & Gas Co., 207 N.E.2d 305, 307 (I11.
Id.
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an instrumentality or agency under the [exclusive] control of
the defendant . . ., and (3) .. .the injury was not due to any
voluntary act or neglect on the part of . . . [plaintiffl. 64
Fact situations involving leakage from USTs are unlikely to
involve contributory negligence by the plaintiff. Also, owing to a
flexible interpretation of "exclusive control" (this includes nondelegable duties), it is unlikely this will be an issue.
As noted above, one Illinois Appellate Court has stated in dicta
that "substantial quantities of gasoline can, in the ordinary course of
affairs, escape from . ..a service station . . . without negligence on
the part of the owner or operator of the [service] station. ' 65 This
language is partially explained by the fact that Illinois UST regulations
had not yet been promulgated and federal UST regulations had only
been in effect for six weeks at the time of the ruling. Nevertheless,
the court's statement is inconsistent with the purpose, breadth and
scope of these complicated regulations which govern every conceivable
aspect of UST ownership and operation. The best approach may be
to allow plaintiffs to plead an action pursuant to res ipsa loquitur,
thereby allowing defendants to submit proof that the conduct complained of was reasonable under the circumstances.
The damages available in UST-based actions for negligence are
compensatory, with punitive damages allowed under certain circumstances. In non-UST property-based actions for negligence, Illinois
courts have assessed damages for inconvenience and discomfort due
to temporary loss of water by adjoining residents, diminution in value
(permanent injury) or restoration costs (temporary injury),6 and in
67
specific cases, punitive damages.

V.

STRICT LIABILITY

6s
Illinois has adopted the century-old rule of Rylands v. Fletcher,
which imposes liability without fault on owners and users of land for
harm resulting to others from abnormally dangerous activities and

64. Lynch v. Precision Machine Shop, Ltd., 443 N.E.2d 569, 572 (11. 1982).
65. Malone v. Ware Oil Co., 534 N.E.2d 1003, 1007 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
66. Hudlin v. City of East St. Louis, 591 N.E.2d 541 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1992).
67. Kemner v. Monsanto Co., 576 N.E.2d 1146, 1152 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)
(citing Loitz v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 563 N.E.2d 397, 401 (Ill. 1990)).
68. Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
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conditions on the land. 69 This rule has been applied in cases involving
unreasonably dangerous products70 and ultrahazardous activities re-

sulting in property damage 71 or personal injury.7 2 The rule has not yet

been addressed in the context of a UST case, although it has been
applied in numerous instances involving the use of flammables and
explosives. 73 In sum, the Illinois rule states that one is strictly liable
- irrespective of whether he or she exercised the utmost care - when

his or her conduct injures another or damages another's property via
a thing or activity which is unduly dangerous and inappropriate to
the place. where it is maintained, taking into consideration the char74
acter of that location and its surroundings.
In determining whether an activity is "unduly hazardous" such
that strict liability is applicable, Illinois courts have defined "unduly
dangerous" as an activity "dangerous in its normal or non-defective
state. ' 75 Because USTs normally contain highly toxic substances (e.g.
gasoline contains benzene, ethylbenzene, toluene, xylene, ethyl dibro76
mide and sometimes lead), it is clearly hazardous in its normal state.
It is suggested, however, that the better analytical approach is to
focus on the activity involved - rather than the nature of the
substances themselves .77 Having adopted the Restatement, 78 Illinois
courts analyze the activity involved according to the following factors:
(1) whether the activity involves a high degree of risk of
harm to others or their property;
69. City of Joliet v. Harwood, 86 Il1. 110 (1877).
70. Suvada v. White Motor Co., 210 N.E.2d 182 (11. 1965).
71. Fitzsimons & Connell Co. v. Braun, 65 N.E. 249 (Ill.
1902).
72. City of Joliet, 86 Ill.
at 111-12.

73. Central Trust & Savings Bank v. Toppert, 554 N.E.2d 820 (111. App. Ct.
1990); Opal v. Material Serv. Corp., 133 N.E.2d 733 (Il. App. Ct. 1956).
74. Continental Bldg. Corp. v. Union Oil Co., 504 N.E.2d 787 (Ill. App. Ct.
1987); WILLIM J. PROSSER ET AL., TORTS § 78 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 519 (1976).
Other jurisdictions have addressed strict liability in UST cases. City of Northglenn
v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 519 F. Supp. 515 (D. Colo. 1981); Yommer v. McKenzie,
257 A.2d 138 (Md. 1969); Exxon Corp. v. Yarema, 516 A.2d 990 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1986); City of Bridgeton v. B.P. Oil, Inc., 369 A.2d 49 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1976); Snyder v. Jessie, 565 N.Y.S.2d 924 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); Hudson v.
Peavey Oil Co., 566 P.2d 175 (Or. 1977).
75. Fallon v. Indian Trail School, 500 N.E.2d 101 (Il1. App. Ct. 1986).
76. John A. Chanin, Comment, Lust On Your Corner: Strict Liability, Victim
Compensation, and Leaking Underground Storage Tanks, 62 U. CoLo. L. Rv. 365,

371 n.41 (1991).
77. Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. v. American Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1181
(7th Cir. 1990).
78. Continental Bldg. Corp., 504 N.E.2d at 790.
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whether the harm which may result will be great;
whether the risk can be eliminated by due care;
whether the activity is a matter of common usage;
whether the activity is appropriate to the location where
it is conducted; and
the activity's value to the community.

All of the above factors need not be present for an activity to be
unduly dangerous.7 9 The most important factors appear to be numbers
1 and 5 above, with the question of appropriateness of location being
the critical determinant.8 0 Interestingly, Comment j to Section 520 of
the Restatement states that storage of large quantities of a highly
flammable liquid, like gasoline, is not an abnormally dangerous
activity in an uninhabited area, but the same activity can be abnormally dangerous in the midst of a heavily populated city."'
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has noted that the baseline
of tort liability in Illinois is negligence, such that when an activity
can be made safer by the exercise of due care there is little need to
invoke strict liability. 2 Conversely, when an injury or damage cannot
be prevented or minimized by the exercise of due care, the application
of strict liability creates an incentive to prevent accidents (not by
using more care, but) by modifying the activity or relocating it."a In
essence, the application of strict liability requires that if the activity
cannot be made safe by applying due care, the activity or its location
should be changed. However, this policy may be impractical for
neighborhood service stations with gasoline USTs.
In rejecting the extension of strict liability to manufacturers of
acrylonitrile for a spill in a residential neighborhood, the Seventh
Circuit found it important that acrylonitrile is not so corrosive or
otherwise destructive that it would "eat through" the railroad tank
car where it was stored during the spill 4 On the other hand, petroleum's corrosive action on bare steel underground tanks, in conjunction with oxidation (rust) from moisture in the surrounding soils, can

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. f (1976).
80. Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. v. American Cyanamid Co., 662 F. Supp. 635
(N.D. Ill. 1987); Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. v. American Cyanamid Co., 517 F. Supp.

79.

314 (N.D. Ill. 1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. j (1976).
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. j (1976).

82. Indiana HarborBelt R.R., 916 F.2d at 1177.
83. Indiana Harbor Belt R.R., 916 F.2d at 1177 (citing Anderson v. Marathon
Petroleum Co., 801 F.2d 936, 939 (7th Cir. 1986)).
84. Indiana Harbor Belt R.R., 916 F.2d at 1179.
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"eat through" the tank in an average of fifteen years." The court
further suggested that the substance's manufacturer was an improper
defendant for purposes of strict liability, implying that the shipper/
transporters were more appropriate defendants. In the case of leaking
USTs, the owners/operators would probably be the appropriate defendants in a legal action. The UST owners and operators are the
individuals charged by state and federal regulations with responsibility
to ensure that leaks and spills do not occur and to conduct a clean6
up if a spill occurs.1
Federal law already imposes strict liability for violation of federal
UST regulations.17 In 1987, the Illinois General Assembly directed the
Illinois Pollution Control Board 8 to promulgate underground storage
tank regulations for Illinois which were identical-in-substance with
the federal UST regulations.89 Although there are no cases specifically
construing liability under Illinois' UST regulations, it is presumed that
the State's identical-in-substance regulations also impose strict liability.
Finally, the Illinois Environmental Protection Act renders owners
and operators of USTs liable to the state for all costs incurred by the
state in preventing or correcting releases of petroleum 9° and liable for
all costs of enforcing the State's identical-in-substance regulations.
Although the statute does not explicitly address intent, the plain
language of the Act appears to be a pure cost recoupment mechanism,
irrespective of fault. It would be ironic - although not unheard of
- for the state to impose strict liability for its own costs and damages,
but not for innocent third parties seeking to redress similar damages
caused by the same event(s).
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Necessity, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 521, 527 n.36 (1986) (citing Congressional
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86. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1988); 40 C.F.R. § 280 (1992); ILL. ADMIN. CODE
tit. 35, §§ 731.110-731.901 (1992).
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696 F. Supp. 275, 287 (W.D. Mich. 1988); United States v. Liviola, 605 F. Supp. 96,
100 (N.D. Ohio 1985).
88. See Michael J. Maher & Karen Rosenwinkel, A Guide Through Illinois'
Environmental Regulatory Maze, 78 ILL. B.J. 18 (Jan. 1990).
89. 1987 ILL. LAWS 3607 (amending ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111/2 para. 1022.4(e)).
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